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Patents Fettering Reproductive Rights 
SCOTT A. ALLEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court decisions over the last half century have established important 
fundamental rights to reproductive choice: the right to procreate as well as the right 
to terminate a pregnancy.1 The Court has rooted these decisions in the Due Process 
and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 using those clauses to 
affirm the applicability of “liberty” and “privacy” to reproductive choice.3 Despite 
the Court’s articulation of a constitutional footing, disagreement exists as to the 
scope of those rights.4 Many believe that constitutional protection of reproductive 
choice should not exist.5 Whatever the source of contention, be it religious, 
scientific, moral, or political, this persistent and steadfast hostility is exacerbated by 
the scientific community’s relentless stretch to push the boundaries of reproductive 
science. Industry continually develops new technologies that provide reproductive 
options as it tries to address the market’s demand for safety, availability, and access 
to further procreative and reproductive choice, even amidst vocal opposition. 
Often neglected in the public debate is the fact that the technologies that 
facilitate reproductive choice are frequently owned as intellectual property.6 
Traditionally, patent protection has been seen as one requisite for commercial 
viability and market success.7 Whether society is ready or not, emerging “new, 
useful, and non-obvious”8 reproductive technologies will be ripe for patent 
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 1. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846.  
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. For example, the Catholic Church has long opposed such reproductive rights. See 
infra note 42. 
 6. The patent system provides protection for inventions in the reproductive arts. See, 
e.g., infra notes 10–15. 
 7. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) (“[T]he dominant justification for the patent system 
has shifted toward an economic rationale based upon incentives. Under this prevalent view, 
the grant of exclusive rights deters quick imitation of the claimed invention and allows a 
period of supernormal profits that help to recoup the investment made in developing the 
invention.”) (citing Robert Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of 
Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273 (1998)). 
 8. The commonly quoted but arguably over-simplified criterion for patentability is that 
an invention must be “new, useful, and non-obvious” in order to warrant patent protection 
under U.S. law. For a good overview of what constitutes patentable subject matter see 
generally 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2010). 
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protection and their inventors will be eligible to secure the robust exclusionary 
rights that patent protection affords. 
Because these patentable reproductive inventions have enabled reproductive 
choice and are often catalysts for reproductive rights, opposition to reproductive 
autonomy has translated into opposition to specific technologies. In turn, 
opposition has slowly begun to find its way into the patent laws that provide 
limited monopolies on reproductive inventions. Unlike inventions of antiquity, the 
advanced technology that now constitutes patent-eligible subject matter has the 
potential to tread on deeply moral, religious, and political ideologies. One 
commentator has noted that “[a]s human existence becomes increasingly embedded 
in technology, the impact of traditionally patentable subject matter upon the 
exercise of individual liberties grows.”9  
There is no area more fundamental to human existence than that of 
reproduction—an area that has recently experienced extraordinary technological 
advances. For example, in the last several decades, patents have been issued on 
technologies ranging from abortive methods,10 pharmaceuticals,11 and 
instruments,12 to in vitro fertilization (IVF),13 cloning (e.g., Dolly),14 and in vitro 
pre-implantation genetic diagnostic (PGD) procedures.15 Reproductive knowledge 
and capabilities have expanded in exponential ways, promising that the future holds 
even more technological advancements. Much of that practical knowledge is 
owned, or has the potential to be owned, as intellectual property. 
These “twenty-first century” technological developments, and the new perceived 
reproductive liberties that may accompany their growth,16 pose new challenges to a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 
610 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Methods of Terminating Pregnancy, U.S. Patent No. 5,356,876 (filed Aug. 
21, 1992) (issued Oct. 18, 1994); Method of Terminating Pregnancy, U.S. Patent No. 
4,073,899 (filed Feb. 27, 1976) (issued Feb. 14, 1978). 
 11. See, e.g., Abortion by Myometrial Administration of Prostaglandins, U.S. Patent No. 
3,852,465 (filed Aug. 16, 1973) (issued Dec. 3, 1974) (“Pharmaceutical preparations of 
abortifacient . . . for injection directly into the uterine muscle of pregnant female mammals, 
including humans, and accomplishing a medical abortion” issued to the Upjohn Company.).  
 12. See, e.g., Method of and Vaginal Insert for Prostaglandin Administration, U.S. 
Patent No. 4,043,339 (filed Feb. 2, 1976) (issued Aug. 26, 1977); Medical Instruments, U.S. 
Patent No. 3,835,843 (filed May 7, 1973) (issued Sept. 17, 1974). 
 13. See, e.g., Methods for In Vitro Fertilization, U.S. Patent No. 7,504,096 B1 (filed 
June 30, 1999) (issued Mar. 17, 2009). 
 14. See Telomerizing Nuclear Donor Cells and Improving the Efficiency on Nuclear 
Transfer, U.S. Patent No. 7,265,262 B2 (filed Mar. 21, 2002) (issued Sep. 4, 2007) (This 
patent is the first of several U.S. patents issued to the Roslin Institute for the work 
surrounding “Dolly,” the sheep. The patent claims “a system for creating cloned cells and 
embryos.” However, some variations of the Dolly method patents claim the products of the 
cloning, raising the possibility of ownership of cloned life.).  
 15. See, e.g., Amplification of Denatured and Stabilized Nucleic Acids, U.S. Patent No. 
7,074,600 B2 (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (issued July 11, 2006).  
 16. For example: “Reproductive rights could refer either to women’s ability to control 
their reproductive lives or to the ability to choose when and how to have offspring. In the 
former case, reproductive rights would help secure equality with men and avoid the 
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constitutionally empowered system of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”17 with eighteenth-century origins. Whether or not the Framers 
contemplated the vast universe of procreative and reproductive developments as 
within the scope of traditionally patentable subject matter,18 the fact remains that as 
section 101 of the Patent Act19 currently stands, inventions related to human 
reproduction will routinely fall within its broad scope. It is likely, however, that the 
Framers did contemplate a patent system that would continue to provide broad and 
robust incentives to invent—a set of incentives that has helped establish the United 
States as a technological superpower and that many feel may be best left 
untouched. 
As currently configured, the patent system is susceptible to use by those 
opposed to reproductive rights—those who desire to prohibit access to reproductive 
and procreative technologies that directly bear on reproductive rights. Taken to its 
extreme, those who want to limit individuals’ ability to exercise their currently 
constitutionally protected rights or future constitutional rights, or desire to deny 
access to technologies on other moral bases, could obtain patent rights (by 
application, assignment, or license) on reproductive technologies and then enforce 
those governmentally granted property rights against any infringer. In other words, 
the same government that affords the rights to reproductive choices as found in the 
Constitution could be forced to grant limitations on the access to a private 
patentee’s reproductive technologies or inventions—regardless of societal value. 
Because a private patentee is a private actor, as opposed to a state actor, the 
                                                                                                                 
subordination that comes from forced motherhood. In the latter case, reproductive rights 
might include the right to have a child engineered to lack a particular disease or disability, or 
more fancifully, the right to have a child with blonde hair and blue eyes, or even a clone of 
one’s self.” Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 
56 EMORY L.J. 843, 858 (2007); see generally Yvonne Cripps, The Art and Science of 
Genetic Modification: Re-Engineering Patent Law and Constitutional Orthodoxies, 11 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004). While the 1943 case of “Skinner v. Oklahoma became the 
Supreme Court precedent for our belief that the right to procreate is so basic, so 
fundamental, that government should not interfere with its exercise,” today “fundamental 
rights remains the basis for protecting . . . reproductive pioneers who are expanding the 
social and medical definitions of who can have babies.” LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE 
CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF 
CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND FAMILY 16–17 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This phrase, which is commonly referred to as the 
Patent Clause or the Intellectual Property Clause, was unanimously approved at the 
ratification convention without any objections. “[T]he uniqueness of the Intellectual Property 
Clause flows from its status as the only enumerated power granted to Congress that 
explicitly defines the mechanism for exercising this power.” Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 54 
(1994).  
 18. Thomas, supra note 9, at 610. See also FENWICK, supra note 16, at 20 (“Applying 
the concept of fundamental rights to reproductive technologies . . . could not have been 
imagined by our forefathers . . . .”). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). This section of the Code is the gatekeeper for access to 
patent protection. Titled “Inventions [P]atentable,” it defines the general scope of what is 
patent eligible. 
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application of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally 
been thought to be inapplicable in this context.20 
Admittedly, only the most rare inventions or pioneer inventions with broad, 
upstream, genus claims would offer alternativeless21 or nearly alternativeless 
solutions to such serious reproductive and procreative concerns. It is reasonable, 
however, to believe that those technologies will be developed22 and that the 
opportunity for abuse is real.23 While counter to the typical economic incentives for 
obtaining patent rights, some undoubtedly see value in denying the market access 
to reproductive options that are against their moral or religious beliefs. 
Alternatively, companies may see an economic advantage to not marketing 
products that will be the target of a very active and vocal opposition. Such acts of 
suppressing patented technologies would be the private equivalent of state 
legislation banning the manufacture, use, or sale of a product—raising serious 
concerns of monopolization of reproductive rights. Moreover, the result of denying 
access to reproductive technology and choice may be to push individuals, mostly 
women, to seek those technologies in foreign jurisdictions. By forcing the market 
outside of the supervision and safety of U.S. regulations, the dangers of 
“reproductive tourism”24 or “fertility tourism” may escalate at an unknown cost to 
Americans, especially to American women.25 
In Part I, this Note will outline the fundamental reproductive rights afforded to 
all United States citizens. It will show why some individuals, organizations, and 
corporations might oppose certain reproductive technologies and, in fact, have an 
extensive history of doing so. Part II of this Note will provide an historical 
example, using the controversy surrounding the abortifacient RU-486, to show how 
patents have previously had implications on access to reproductive choice. Part II 
also demonstrates why one might suspect that, in the future, individuals, 
organizations, or corporations with private agendas might again manipulate the 
property rights afforded by the United States patent system in a way that could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See Thomas, supra note 9, at 571. 
 21. Expanding on the idea that in patent law an “applicant is entitled to be his or her 
own lexicographer,” the term “alternativeless” is used throughout this Note to succinctly 
describe broad, upstream, or pioneer inventions that are not easily designed around. MPEP § 
2111.01(IV) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). 
 22. Only alternativeless or nearly alternativeless solutions to reproductive and 
procreative concerns would be at issue. In other words, if a patented technology has generic 
substitutes or equivalents, a patient would not be denied access to the reproductive choice by 
only prohibiting access to the one patented technology. However, such alternativeless, 
upstream technologies are likely to be developed, even if currently unknowable. After all, 
people once thought that it would be impossible to divide the atom.  
 23. Technology suppression has a disturbingly robust history in the U.S. patent system. 
See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to 
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 402–17 (2002) (recounting the history 
of patent suppression and discussing several examples). 
 24. See infra text accompanying note 207. 
 25. Artificial reproductive technologies place a greater burden on the female body than 
the male body. The chemicals used to increase the rate of ovulation as well as the 
implantation procedures themselves uniquely tax the female body, without risk to the male 
body. See infra text accompanying notes 212–13.  
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deny citizens access to technologies that they perceive as critical to their 
constitutional reproductive rights. Part III will survey the possible legislative or 
judicial options for addressing such a conundrum, identifying some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of fashioning an institutional level change to allow 
patent law to remain in accord with perceived constitutional reproductive freedoms. 
For, without a solution, unanticipated limitations to freedoms may result. As some 
have already recognized, “due to the quickly evolving nature of medical science, 
the debate regarding procreative freedom must expand to encompass these 
[possibilities].”26 
I. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, AND PATENTS THEREON 
The Supreme Court has established fundamental rights to reproductive choice: 
the right to procreate as well as the right to terminate a pregnancy. While Supreme 
Court decisions ensure that the government cannot interfere with those rights, they 
do not protect individuals from private actors who deny those rights.27 In light of a 
long history of vigorous opposition to reproductive rights, the robust property 
rights afforded by patent protection may provide fertile opportunity for private 
actors to promote a private agenda for reproductive choice. Conceivably, private 
actors could use patents to circumvent important fundamental reproductive rights 
by withholding patented reproductive technology from the public. 
A. Reproductive Rights and Their Opponents 
The constitutional right not to have a child was established by the Supreme 
Court in the seminal case of Roe v. Wade.28 It was solidified and reaffirmed in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.29 Although instructive, even without exploring the 
details and intricacies of those cases, without detailing the strands of cases 
preceding or following those decisions, and without doing justice to the tremendous 
struggle associated with the development of the right to terminate a pregnancy, 
suffice it to say the “right to choose” is now rooted in this country’s supreme 
governing document: 
Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It declares that no State shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The controlling word 
in the cases before us is “liberty.”30 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Renée C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency 
Contraception, and as an Abortifacient Under the Law of Contraception, 79 OR. L. REV. 
1121, 1124 (2000). 
 27.  See infra note 64. 
 28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 30. Id. at 846. 
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Predating the cases that established “the right to choose” as we currently know 
it, the “liberty” associated with the procreative right to have a child was articulated 
in the 1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.31 In Skinner, the Supreme Court struck 
down a forced sterilization law that allowed criminals convicted of certain crimes 
to be subjected to sexually sterilizing medical procedures.32 In his opening 
paragraph, Justice Douglas wrote: “Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a 
right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”33 In 
determining that such sterilization programs were unconstitutional, the Court stated 
that “marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival 
of the race.”34 The Court noted that it was dealing with “one of the basic civil rights 
of man,” a “basic liberty.”35  
In Stanley v. Illinois,36 the Court noted that Skinner set forth a right to “conceive 
and to raise one’s children,” which is a right “far more precious . . . than property 
rights.”37 The justices who decided Skinner were “moved to recognize . . . a right to 
reproductive autonomy in part because of fear about the invidious and potentially 
genocidal way in which government control over reproductive matters might be 
exercised if the choice of whether or when to beget a child were to be transferred 
from the individual to the state.”38 
In summarizing these rights on paper, it is easy to overlook the immense moral, 
political, and religious implications that accompany them. The underlying moral 
issues that flow from these rights deeply divide people throughout this nation; the 
implications they invoke gives this sphere of rights a delicate dynamic and shades 
them with strong emotional color. In Gonzales v. Carhart,39 for example, the Court 
dealt with a previability, but late-term, abortion technique framed by some 
members of Congress as “a gruesome and inhumane procedure.”40 The startling 
testimony, submitted as evidence, described the “dilation and extraction” abortion 
procedure at issue in the following manner: 
The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube 
into the opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out . . . . He cut the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also FENWICK, supra note 16, at 16. 
 32. The Court struck down Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act of 1935, 
which permitted the state to authorize compulsory sterilization of felons who committed acts 
of moral turpitude. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
 33. Id. at 536. 
 34. Id. at 541. 
 35. Id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term: Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1977) (“For the state 
to deny such a choice is for the organized society to deny the individual [the] presumptive 
right to be treated as a person, one of equal worth among citizens.”). 
 36. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 37. Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of the Clones . . . and the Issues of Clones, 3 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002) (discussing Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and 
quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651). 
 38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1339 (2d ed. 1988). 
 39. 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (determining the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003). 
 40. Id. at 141. 
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umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan, 
along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.41 
In addition to enormous opposition from fundamental religious groups, led 
prominently by the Catholic Church and its membership,42 it is not difficult to see 
how others could be otherwise morally or viscerally opposed to the exercise of 
these rights. If a five-member majority of the Supreme Court can let their partially 
subjective perspective on the “humanity” of a seemingly constitutionally protected 
abortive medical procedure affect the scope of that right, then it is not surprising 
that many others, possibly less open minded and less knowledgeable about the 
ramifications of such a decision, could feel similarly.  
In fact, many highly motivated and politically active individuals and 
organizations have a history of forceful opposition to reproductive technologies 
much less “gruesome” and much more frequently required than the extremely 
rarely used dilation and extraction procedure in Carhart.43 History illustrates that 
almost any invention or technology used in connection with creating or ending 
human life has encountered at least some, if not forceful, opposition.  
For instance, opposition to the use of contraceptives, which resulted in the well-
known contraception cases and was squarely addressed by the Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,44 is still healthfully alive today. Individuals and organizations opposed 
to contraceptives have simply found new battlefronts to oppose that reproductive 
choice, even as birth control and contraceptives have become mainstream. 
Recently, pro-life pharmacists, with support from large, pro-life, anti-abortion 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. at 139 (citation omitted). 
 42. The Catholic Church, claiming over one billion members, has long opposed 
contraceptives and prophylactics and now opposes almost all other modern reproductive 
technologies, methods, and procedures that are not a part of “natural” family planning. See 
POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE: ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE PAUL VI (July 25, 1968), 
reprinted in HUMANAE VITAE AND THE BISHOPS: THE ENCYCLICAL AND THE STATEMENTS OF 
THE NATIONAL HIERARCHIES 33 (John Horgan ed., 1972); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
EVANGELIUM VITAE (Mar. 25, 1995), reprinted in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 792 (J. 
Michael Miller ed., 1996). The Catholic Church and its membership are said to be 
responsible for the birth of the “right to life” movement. See ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING 
OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 85 (2008). In a 
more recent example, the Catholic Church had a large influence on keeping abortions out of 
the Health Reform Act of 2010. Letter from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops to 
U.S. Senate on Healthcare (Sept. 30, 2009), available at www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care. 
 43. Dilation and extraction procedures are rarely, if ever, a justifiable means of abortion. 
See, e.g., Janet E. Gans Epner, Harry S. Jonas & Daniel L. Seckinger, Late-term Abortions, 
280(8) JAMA 724, 729 (1998) (“[T]he AMA recommended that the intact D&X procedure 
not be used unless alternative procedure pose materially greater risk to the woman.”). This 
type of technology may not be the type of technology that a majority of the public would 
demand, but it is illustrative of the intense controversies that exist in this sphere of 
reproductive rights. 
 44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that states may not criminalize the use of 
contraceptives). 
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groups, have begun to refuse to fill prescriptions for contraceptives.45 In some 
instances, pharmacists have refused to return the unfilled prescriptions to customers 
after refusing to provide birth control, effectively denying any route for that 
customer to purchase her prescribed contraceptive, even from another pharmacy.46 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, large opposition was mounted against the 
development of “test-tube baby” procedures as in vitro fertilization became 
publicly marketed. Like contraceptives, in vitro fertilization still engenders 
opposition even as the procedure has become medically accepted.47 Activists 
opposing IVF procedures have lobbied so strenuously over the years that 
governments throughout the world have, to varying extents and degrees, banned 
embryonic research, surrogate motherhood, PGD procedures, and a cornucopia of 
other embryonic transfers and treatments. Germany, for example, issued its version 
of embryo protection legislation, called the Embryo Protection Act of 1990,48 partly 
out of fear of being stigmatized as advocating potentially eugenic technology 
reminiscent of the horrors that still emanate from its not-so-distant past. 
History provides several examples of boycotts of companies affiliated with 
reproductive pharmaceuticals. Notably, the Upjohn Company was the victim of a 
nationwide boycott after the company decided to market FDA-approved 
Prostaglandins, a drug used to induce abortions.49 Pro-life groups staged a 
nationwide boycott of all Upjohn products, such as Nuprin, Motrin, and Unicap, for 
over two years.50 After rallies at the Upjohn Company’s national headquarters and 
significant pressure from company shareholders who sympathized with the 
boycotters, Upjohn stopped all research and production of such drugs.51 The pro-
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Examples of such pro-life pharmacies are those registered through Pharmacists for 
Life International (PFLI). See PHARMACISTS FOR LIFE INT’L, www.pfli.org. Doctors and 
pharmacists have refused for other reasons as well. See Caroline Bollinger, Access Denied: 
Find Out Why Growing Numbers of Doctors and Pharmacists Across the US Are Refusing to 
Prescribe or Dispense Birth Control Pills, PREVENTION MAG., Aug. 2004 at 150. These 
pharmacies chose to exclude medicines from the inventories even though it would be 
economically beneficial to provide those prescriptions. 
 46. See Noesen v. State Dep’t Regulation & Licensing, Pharm. Examining Bd., 751 
N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). In such an instance, a patient would have to seek a doctor 
to write another prescription—conceivably allowing too much time to elapse for certain 
prescriptions to be effective.  
 47. For example, Robert Edwards was awarded the 2010 Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine “for the development of human in vitro fertilization.” Press Release, The Nobel 
Assembly, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2010 to Robert G. Edwards (Oct. 4, 
2010). The press release estimated that 10% of the world’s couples are affected by infertility 
and would therefore potentially benefit from IVF.  
 48. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG) [German 
Act for Protection of Embryos (The Embryo Protection Act)], Dec. 13, 1990, BGBL. I 2746 
(Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eschg/gesamt.pdf 
(English translation available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/1147/ESchG%20eng 
lisch.pdf). 
 49. Mindy J. Lees, I Want a New Drug: RU-486 and the Right to Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1113, 1122 (1990). 
 50. Id. at 1122–23. 
 51. Id. at 1123. 
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life movement continues to be one of the most politically mobilized and vocal 
lobbying groups in the nation.52 The National Right to Life Committee is the largest 
pro-life organization in the United States, and it has historically organized Catholic 
and non-Catholic activists into one unified group.53  
From this small sample of the opposition to reproductive rights, it is easy to 
imagine the myriad ways that technologies engender actions and emotions of 
individuals and organizations. Those opposed to reproductive choice spend 
significant time and money to uphold and advocate their beliefs. Additionally, it 
sometimes makes more economic sense for corporations to withhold controversial 
technology than to market it and face damage to their image and consumer 
boycotts. It is clear that not only “gruesome” methods, like the rarely used 
technology in Carhart, but almost any technology under the sun that treads on 
human reproduction will provoke and enrage someone. 
B. Patents and Reproductive Technologies 
The equipment and instrumentation for medical procedures, like the seldom-
used dilation and extraction procedure in Gonzales v. Carhart as well as the other 
more common reproductive technologies that have garnered opposition, are clearly 
patent eligible under the broad umbrella of current 35 U.S.C. § 101.54 Not 
surprisingly, the medical device industry, a particularly profitable market, is one of 
the most highly patented fields of technology.55  
If the Carhart Court had been composed of a different political and ideological 
membership,56 the “gruesome,”57 but patentable, dilation and extraction procedure, 
which was banned by the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,58 could have 
been found to be definitively within the scope of the governmentally enforced 
“right to choose.” From a reading of the dissenting opinions, it is apparent how 
close and controversial this Supreme Court decision was: “Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion essentially accuses the majority—five politically and religiously 
conservative males—of writing their morality into the Constitution.”59 The 
procedure and associated instrumentation remain potentially patentable. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., http://www.nrlc.org/. 
 54. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 55. The medical instrument field is notoriously patent active. There were over 4500 
patents issued in the year of 2009 alone in the technology of just 600 Class “surgery” 
inventions. See USPTO, PATENT COUNTS BY CLASS BY YEAR REPORT, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.pdf.  
 56. The decision in Gonzales v. Carhart was a five-to-four split. Some commentators 
have suggested that Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was meant to imply that “a Court that once 
included two women would not have ruled this way.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. 
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 24–25 (2d ed. Supp. 2009).  
 57. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007). 
 58. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 59. ESKRIDGE, JR. & HUNTER, supra note 56, at 24. 
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procedure remains “the safest procedure for late term (previability) abortions”60 
and, although rarely used, it could easily come back within the scope of the rights 
afforded by Roe and Casey with a change of Court composition and mind set.  
Posit the case of a woman who inadvertently ingested a drug that caused 
permanent malformations of her late-term unborn child.61 What if, as with the 
patent eligible procedure and instrumentation in Carhart, the procedure she needed 
was the best, safest, and alternativeless procedure? Obviously, as raised in the 
Carhart litigation, there would be an argument that depriving her of that particular 
procedure would be equivalent to depriving her of her constitutional rights. As a 
rational person, she might necessarily and, perhaps desperately, oppose a decision 
such as Carhart, despite how “gruesome” morally biased individuals (as we all are) 
may perceive the procedure. 
Now imagine that the Supreme Court had made a different decision and the 
hypothetical women’s right to choose to use the safest procedure to abort the child 
is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But instead 
of a Court-imposed ban, groups or individuals with beliefs similar to those of the 
five-member Carhart majority, or religious groups simply opposed to all abortions, 
own or buy the patent rights to the abortion procedure and the associated 
instrumentation and refuse to license their use. Would the federal government’s 
enforcement of the private patentee’s property rights interfere with the 
constitutional rights to reproductive choice? Would a private patentee be denying a 
U.S. citizen her constitutional right to use the safest procedure to abort the child? 
Stated differently, “[i]f Congress unduly restricted a fundamental liberty 
interest” in reproductive technologies or inventions, “a facial challenge would 
prove fatal to the statute.”62 But, “if the U.S. Patent Office . . . issued identically 
worded patent claims to a private actor, the patent could be freely enforced without 
regard to constitutional limitations.”63 This is because a private patentee is not a 
state actor and is, therefore, currently unrestricted by the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.64  
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Id. at 25. 
 61. It is not difficult to imagine this scenario, especially since pharmacological mix ups 
occur at an uncomfortably high frequency. See, e.g., Associated Press, Pregnant Woman 
Waits to See if Pill Harmed Embryo, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 10, 2011, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41481554/ns/health-womens_health (reporting a case of a 
pregnant women who was accidently administered a chemotherapy pharmaceutical instead 
of an antibiotic).  
 62. Thomas, supra note 9, at 571.  
 63. Id. (citation omitted). 
 64. The state action doctrine is generally considered to be a limitation on the operation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has been described as a “tool with which the courts attempt 
to balance at least three competing interests: (1) individual autonomy—the individual’s 
interest in preserving broad areas of life in which he or she can develop and act without 
being subjected to the restraints placed by the Constitution on governmental action, (2) 
federalism—the nation’s interest in preserving the proper balance between state and national 
power, especially the power of states to determine, within generous limits, the extent to 
which regulatory power should be applied to private action, and (3) constitutional rights—
the interest in protecting constitutional rights against invasion by government or by action 
fairly attributable to government.” G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State 
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A valid patent affords its owner a broad, but limited, twenty-year term of 
negative rights: 
Although the twenty-year patent term is short in comparison to other 
intellectual property rights, few restraining doctrines allay a patent’s 
scope of exclusivity. Liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text 
of the patent instrument with an accused infringement, whether or not 
the defendant derived the invention from the patentee. The patent law 
also lacks an effective defense . . . of . . . fair use privilege.65 
Using the facts of Gonzales v. Carhart as illustration, one can see how, in light of a 
patentee’s traditionally robust rights, the act of withholding technologies that 
provide the safest, best, or alternativeless routes to enable the desired reproductive 
outcome could be seen as bearing on constitutional rights.  
In fact, this scenario, a variation on “patent blocking,” is not as far-fetched as it 
may seem. By substituting the rarely used dilation and extraction technology at 
issue in Carhart with a technology that more Americans would demand access to, 
but that would still engender opposition, the scenario quickly becomes 
frighteningly realistic. For example, a morning-after-style pill that could 
repetitively be taken without adverse medical effects could be used after each act of 
unprotected sex.66 Such a pill might be seen as promoting pre-marital sex and 
promoting abortion by, for example, the National Right to Life Committee and its 
immense membership.67 From another perspective, it could be seen as a 
revolutionary way to eliminate the pitfalls of daily birth control pills68 and mitigate 
the social stigma and health consequences of abortifacients and abortion 
procedures. Under such a hypothetical, the patent system might easily become a 
                                                                                                                 
Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 339–
40 (1997). Unfortunately, it also has been described as “a conceptual disaster area” and as “a 
torchless search for a way out of a damp echoing cave.” Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: 
“State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 
(1967). 
 65. Thomas, supra note 9, at 576 (comparing twenty-year patent term under 35 U.S.C. § 
154(a)(2) (1952) with life-plus-seventy-year term of a copyright per 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) 
(2000)) (citation omitted). 
 66. While “[d]ata are not available on the safety of current regimens of ECPs 
[“emergency contraceptive pills”] if used frequently over a long period of time,” there is at 
least some concern about frequent repeated use in additional to a slew of common side 
effects. James Trussell & Elizabeth G. Raymond, Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance 
to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy, EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION WEBSITE (June 2011), 
available at http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/EC-review.pdf.  
 67. The National Right to Life Committee is a federation with affiliate organizations in 
all fifty states, some 3000 local chapters, and a membership, by some estimates, of nearly 
seven million people. See NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE AFFILIATE INDEX, 
http://www.nrlc.org/states/index.html. 
 68. For example, Planned Parenthood has identified that “[a]lmost all women on the pill 
forget to take it at some time. The pill works best when taken on time, every day—but 
knowing what to do when you forget could save you from having an unplanned pregnancy.” 
Birth Control Pills, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-
topics/birth-control/birth-control-pill-4228.htm. Eliminating concerns such as these would 
allow for a more consequence-free sexual environment.  
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useful tool in restricting access to reproductive technologies. With the potential 
universe of technologies of the future, history illustrates that reproductive 
technologies, such as the morning-after pill described above, are certainly fertile 
grounds for exploitation and controversy. 
II. A HISTORY OF WITHHELD TECHNOLOGY AND A POTENTIAL FUTURE 
A. RU-486 
In 1982, “[a] revolutionary new development . . . emerged in the drug industry. 
A new drug, RU-486, ha[d] the ability to induce abortions without the need for 
surgery and, thus, ha[d] the potential to radically alter current abortion 
procedures.”69 The drug was one that, at the time, seemed so revolutionary that the 
drug’s developer, endocrinologist Dr. Etienne-Emile Baulieu, received “one of 
America’s most prestigious medical awards for [the invention].”70 Yet, not 
surprisingly, at the same time the drug was described by forceful and vocal 
opponents as “chemical warfare against the unborn”71 and as the “death pill.”72 
The French-made drug, RU-486, is a pill that allows for an abortion by chemical 
inducement up to eight weeks after conception.73 RU-486 interferes with the 
hormone progesterone, which is secreted during a woman’s natural reproductive 
cycle: 
[Progesterone] caus[es] the uterine wall to thicken, allowing a fertilized 
ovum to implant and mature in the womb. Progesterone must be 
produced continually until the placenta is in the place . . . . Without 
progesterone, the uterine lining deteriorates in a process similar to the 
menstrual cycle.74 
Ironically, the pill with so much promise, a pill so groundbreaking that French 
Health Minister Claude Évin pronounced that, once produced, RU-486 “became the 
moral property of women, not just the property of a drug company,”75 was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Lees, supra note 49, at 1113. 
 70. Id. (citing Associated Press, Developer of Disputed Abortion Pill Receives 
Prestigious Award, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, pt. I, at 37) (announcing that the Albert 
Lasker Medical Research Award was presented to Dr. Baulieu on September 17, 1989). 
 71. Id. (citing Ellen Goodman, Abortion: By Pill . . . , WASH. POST, July 29, 1989, at 
A17). 
 72. Id. (citing Emily MacFarquhar, The Case of the Reluctant Drug Maker: An Abortion 
Pill That’s not for Sale, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1989, at 54). 
 73. There are varying statistics on the point of how long after conception the RU-486 
pill will effectively terminate a pregnancy. Early research suggested that the success rate 
approached nearly 100% effectiveness when RU-486 was taken within the first five weeks of 
pregnancy. See Lees, supra note 49, at 1118; Gwendolyn Protho, RU 486 Examined: Impact 
of a New Technology on an Old Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 725–26 (1997). 
 74. Seema L. Nene, Will Freedom Ring Soon for the Reproductive Rights Movement?, 3 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 113–14 (1993). 
 75. Steven Greenhouse, France Ordering Company to Sell Its Abortion Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1988 (emphasis added); see also LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF 
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effectively banned from U.S. citizens. This was due in part to the hostile political 
climate under the administration of conservatively rooted U.S. President, George 
H.W. Bush.76 But other factors also led to RU-486’s demise: mobilized anti-
abortion groups targeted Roussel-Uclaf, the French-based manufacturer of RU-486, 
pressuring the company to discontinue the pill;77 and, pivotally, Roussel-Uclaf was 
unwilling to license its U.S. patent out of fear that the company would be affiliated 
with the image of RU-486 as a genocidal “death pill.”78 Roussel-Uclaf used its U.S. 
patent rights to effectively prohibit any use of the pill within the United States, 
even though it was said that the pill could directly serve “health benefits . . . for 
millions of women worldwide.”79 The patent was withheld even though it may have 
provided an alternativeless abortive means to certain U.S. women, who have 
reproductive rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment under Roe and 
Casey.80 
In May 1994, after careful negotiation and an executive order by President 
Clinton,81 the RU-486 pill was eventually licensed to the Population Council, a not-
for-profit organization, the mission of which is to “improve the well-being and 
reproductive health of current and future generations.”82 Professor John Thomas 
postulated that RU-486 “might not be available in the United States had more 
politically conservative individuals controlled Roussel[-]Uclaf.”83 Further, Thomas 
suggested that had RU-486 “been assigned to say, the National Right to Life 
Committee,” the marketing scheme for RU-486, or lack thereof, would have been 
dramatically altered, to say the least.84 In the midst of such controversy and 
                                                                                                                 
WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 313 (2002). 
 76. Wyser-Pratte, supra note 26, at 1125 (The George H.W. Bush Administration 
prohibited importation based on “political considerations rather than concerns for public 
health . . . .”). 
 77. Nene, supra note 74, at 115. “Roussel-Uclaf . . . is controlled by the giant 
international firm, Hoechst. As a descendent of the German company that produced cyanide 
for the Nazi death camps, Hoechst has been lobbied hard by pro-life leaders and has been 
frightened by rhetoric about ‘chemical warfare against the unborn’ and by threats of boycotts 
of other products.” Lees, supra note 49, at 1113 n.3 (quoting Ellen Goodman, Abortion: By 
Pill . . ., WASH. POST, July 29, 1989, at A17). 
 78. Sharon Bernstein, Secret Deals, Big Money and Abortion Politics - to Bring RU-486 
to This Country, Wealthy and Influential Private Citizens Put Up Money—and Lots of It, 
ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 26, 2000, at G1. 
 79. Lees, supra note 49, at 1127 (quoting Rone Tempest, French Drug Firm Bows to 
Protest, Halts Abortion Pill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1988, pt. I, at 12, col. 1.). 
 80. RU-486 also, and importantly, had the potential to allow women to obtain abortions 
without the stigmatizing and socially unacceptable experience of obtaining a surgical 
procedure at abortion clinics. 
 81. One of President Clinton’s first official acts as president was to issue a 
memorandum directing the FDA to analyze RU-486. See Memorandum on Importation of 
RU-486, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 57, 89 (Jan. 22, 1993); see also JUDICIAL WATCH, 
INC., A JUDICIAL WATCH SPECIAL REPORT: THE CLINTON RU-486 FILES (2006), available at 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/archive/2006/jw-ru486-report.pdf. 
 82. Our Mission, THE POPULATION COUNCIL, http://www.popcouncil.org/who/about.asp. 
 83. Thomas, supra note 9, at 582. 
 84. Id. 
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political posturing, the RU-486 pill remains extremely inaccessible, even following 
the pill’s September 2000 FDA approval (eighteen years after its discovery).85  
B. A Potential Future 
With historical evidence of how a very important technology with the ability to 
dramatically change the landscape of reproductive rights was withheld by a 
company (under anti-abortion pressure, for example), it is not too difficult to 
imagine future technologies invoking a similar response. Since “[t]he early 
stewards of our patent system never envisioned the prospect of public advocates 
anticipating objectionable activities, prosecuting patent applications, and being 
granted a proprietary interest in prohibitive regulation,”86 such future technologies 
now pose opportunities to manipulate the patent system to further private agendas. 
From that perspective, with the rapid pace of new inventions, and with the 
increased intermingling of technology with reproduction, not only will the 
constitutional right not to have a child be increasingly implicated, but the 
constitutional right to reproduce may also be brought back into the limelight.87  
Since 2002, when Professor Thomas commented on abortion rights in relation to 
RU-486, technology has continued its ever-expanding course. In particular, 
technologies like IVF88—the process by which human egg cells are fertilized by 
sperm outside the body—in combination with the strides in understanding human 
gene sequences,89 have opened the door for scientists to develop many so-called 
PGD procedures.90 PGD procedures are currently used to test the embryos used in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. The pill is not prescribed as a pharmaceutical prescription, but rather must be given 
from a specially licensed doctor, creating additional hurdles and rendering the drug relatively 
inaccessible. See Tania Khan & Megan Arvad McCoy, Access to Contraception, 6 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 785, 790–91 (2005). 
 86. Thomas, supra note 9, at 576. By way of counter example, universities across the 
nation currently prosecute patents simply to ensure that technologies can be freely used 
instead of exploited by corporations.  
 87. See Balkin, supra note 16 (postulating a future of reproductive rights that includes 
the right to have a child genetically engineered to be free of certain genetic traits); see also 
FENWICK, supra note 16, at 23 (“Mothers and fathers today are exercising their fundamental 
rights of procreation and privacy in unorthodox ways . . . .”).  
 88. “The first ‘test tube’ baby, Louise Brown, was born in 1978, and thereafter IVF 
followed by transfer of pre-embryos to a woman’s uterus allowed those who were aware of 
their risk, as well as single parents, homosexual couples, and couples with fertility problems, 
to select both the ova and sperm that would be brought together in fertilization attempts in 
vitro.” Roberta M. Berry, Can Bioethics Speak to Politics About the Prospect of Inheritable 
Genetic Modification? If So, What Might it Say?, in THE ETHICS OF INHERITABLE GENETIC 
MODIFICATION: A DIVIDING LINE? 243, 253 (John E.J. Rasko, Gabrielle M. O’Sullivan & 
Rachel A. Ankeny eds. 2006). IVF technologies open the door to innumerable reproductive 
possibilities.  
 89. See, e.g., HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_ 
Genome/home.shtml.  
 90. “By the 1990s, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) became available for use 
in conjunction with an IVF procedure. This allowed future parents to test for certain 
conditions in the pre-embryos created in vitro and selectively transfer to the women’s uterus 
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IVF for genetic defects, such as deafness, cystic fibrosis, and gender,91 but PGD 
also have the potential to be used for an increasingly diverse array of possible 
indicators with unknown ramifications on moral, religious, and socially acceptable 
behavior. As understanding of how human characteristics, like obesity, are linked 
to particular gene sequences increases, parents may be able to preselect growing 
numbers of characteristics of their offspring, raising the specter of “designer 
babies.”92 The “[US]PTO inevitably will grant patents on biological discoveries 
with such eugenic potential,”93 similar to the eugenic potential that was of concern 
in Skinner v. Oklahoma.94 In that vein, “the same umbrella of rights that the 
Supreme Court has extended toward procreation and contraception could also be 
used to cover PGD and to protect a parent’s right to engage in genetic, as well as 
reproductive, choice.”95 
In particular, and related to an issue on the minds of many American citizens 
given the media attention surrounding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”96 and gay marriage, 
the possibility of linking homosexual orientation to a gene sequence is a real 
possibility. It would afford parents-to-be the ability to screen out embryos that 
show the indicators for homosexuality or, conversely, same-sex couples may select 
offspring with the indicators for homosexual orientation. In that regard, the idea of 
anticipatory patent blocking has already become an issue looming on the horizon. 
For example, Dr. Dean Hamer, a leading geneticist in the field of inheritable 
homosexuality,97 has published works indicating his desire to patent the “gay 
gene,” if discovered, and use patent rights to prohibit its use. Dr. Hamer has stated: 
I could try to use the law to withhold the “testing” technology, should it 
ever become available. Genetic testing as practiced in the United States 
                                                                                                                 
only those that were not affected by a detected condition.” Berry, supra note 88, at 253. 
 91. See id. at 254–59; see also Zachary P. Demko, Matthew Rabinowitz & David 
Johnson, Current Methods for Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 13 J. CLINICAL 
EMBRYOLOGY 6, 10 (2010) (“Over the last 20 years, the scope of PGD has expanded to 
include screening for a wide range of disease-linked genes, as well as screening for 
aneuploidy at all chromosomes.”); Alan H. Handyside, John G. Lesko, Juan J. Tarín, Robert 
M.L. Winston & Mark R. Hughes, Birth of a Normal Girl After In Vitro Fertilization and 
Preimplantation Diagnosis Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 905 (1992) 
(announcing the first successful attempt at the procedure). 
 92. “[A]lmost no one wants designer babies. No one wants to live in a brave new world 
in which parents peruse a catalog of traits and carefully select their perfect child,” but 
“individually and case-by-case, genetic selection frequently makes sense.” DEBORA L. SPAR, 
THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF 
CONCEPTION 123 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 93. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 
578 (2006). 
 94. See TRIBE, supra note 38, at 1339. 
 95. SPAR, supra note 92, at 125. 
 96. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993). 
 97. Dr. Dean Hamer is a prolific writer and, in particular, the author of a 1993 paper 
suggesting that certain genes were responsible for predisposing men toward homosexuality. 
See Dean H. Hamer, Stella Hu, Victoria L. Magnuson, Nan Hu & Angela M.L. Pattatucci, A 
Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 
SCI. 321 (1993).  
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requires commercialization, and commercialization generally requires 
protection of intellectual property through patents. If a lab does 
discover a “gay gene,” it might be able to control the licensing of the 
technology.98   
Others have written that “[Hamer] also vowed to patent his genetic testing 
techniques to insure that they could not be used in a discriminatory way.”99 
The relative dearth or abundance of potential outrage from individuals, 
organizations, or corporations opposing the withholding of this patented “gay gene” 
technology on moral, social, religious, or other grounds is not pivotal to this 
discussion. Rather, Dr. Hamer’s views are simply illustrative of the fact that people 
are aware of how to manipulate the rights that a patent affords to advance a private 
moral, social, or religious agenda. Whether or not the agenda is categorically for 
good or bad, it is a private, not public, social agenda nonetheless. Furthermore, the 
future of what people perceive as “fundamental” rights, “personal liberties,” or 
within their “right to choose” is entirely predictable, but only to the extent that 
those perceptions will change over time.100 In the future “reproductive rights might 
include the right to have a child engineered to lack a particular disease or disability, 
or more fancifully, the right to have a child with blonde hair and blue eyes, or even 
a clone of one’s self.”101  
With that being said, the future of technologies or inventions with the capacity 
to influence the sphere of reproductive choice is doubly difficult to fathom. The 
technological future may have reproductive “miracles” in store that our current 
society can only begin to conceptualize. For example, if we currently have the 
ability to regenerate full fingers from certain cellular matrices102 and to grow 
completely new livers from a combination of fetal cells and cadaver organs,103 it is 
not totally outside the realm of possibility to regenerate or grow a new uterus or 
ovaries for women. Such a development might provide alternatives for those who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR THE 
GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 219 (1994). 
 99. Garland E. Allen, The Double-Edged Sword of Genetic Determinism: Social and 
Political Agendas in Genetic Studies of Homosexuality, 1940–1994, in SCIENCE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITIES 242, 243 (Vernon A. Rosario ed., 1997). 
 100. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 101. Balkin, supra note 16, at 858. 
 102. See Wyatt Andrews, Medicine’s Cutting Edge: Re-Growing Organs, CBS NEWS 
(Feb. 11, 2009, 3:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/22/sunday/ 
main3960219.shtml (“[The powder used in this technology] is a substance made from pig 
bladders called extracellular matrix. It is a mix of protein and connective tissue surgeons 
often use to repair tendons and it holds some of the secrets behind the emerging new science 
of regenerative medicine.”). The potential application for regeneration of body parts is 
limitless—businesses, such as the Tengion Company, have already bought licenses to the 
patented technology. Id. 
 103. See Daniel J. DeNoon, First Human Liver Grown in Lab, WEBMD HEALTH NEWS 
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.webmd.com/news/20101029/first-human-liver-grown-in-lab 
(“The organs are grown on ‘scaffolds’ created from cadaver organs . . . . When fetal cells 
from the appropriate organ are pumped into the scaffold, they hone in on the appropriate 
location and begin to grow.”). 
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are infertile, for whatever reason, or could benefit stem cell research generally. 
Would such a procedure or organ transplant, one that arguably represents an 
advancement in reproductive research, be hindered by new moral or religious 
concerns surrounding stem cell research? Would the government’s interference 
with access to a procedure or enforcement of patent rights of someone withholding 
or overpricing this technology implicate the rights espoused in Skinner? In the 
future there may be a drug or a series of hormone injections that could restore 
sexual fertility, but only by harvesting the chemicals or hormones from developing 
in vitro embryos. Or, while possibly only marginally less “shocking”104 than a 
dilation and extraction abortion procedure, what if a chemical injection could be 
used to safely dissolve and breakdown a fetus in utero, including late in pregnancy? 
Would the Court extend the window on the right to choose in that instance? Would 
society eventually demand such a freedom of choice? 
While such technologies seem far-fetched to some, they are as likely to occur in 
some fashion as splitting the atom was to occur for the societies of the pre-atomic 
era. These technologies may implicate the much less explored realm of the 
fundamental right to procreate as well as the oft-discussed right not have a child. 
Serious thought must be invested into designing a preemptive system to deal with 
the inevitable technologies of the future and how they will align with the inevitable 
changes in the perception of (or actual changes in) fundamental reproductive rights 
in future societies.  
In the context of genetic engineering, one commentator has noted that medical 
technology in the United States is likely “to proceed along different channels, 
channels that may keep the most far reaching innovations out of public 
consciousness until they have become impossible to eliminate.”105 Expanding on 
that reasoning, in the realm of reproductive rights, as reproductive technology 
develops and “proceed[s] along different channels” (namely, the back laboratories 
of large, private corporations),106 important, maybe revolutionary, technologies that 
would be opposed by certain groups will be developed, similarly to RU-486. And, 
just like the RU-486 scenario, due to vocal opposition groups and generous patent 
procurement, the technology may never be marketed out of fear of boycotts and 
negative press. Thus, those technologies will become not “impossible to eliminate” 
but, rather, impossible to integrate. 
III. SOLUTIONS TO MITIGATE THE CIRCUMVENTION OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
Changes to the patent system have been carefully implemented over time to 
preserve its delicate balance of incentives.107 While exploring solutions in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007). 
 105. June Carbone, Roadblocks or Bypasses?: Religion, Science, and the Future of 
Genetic Engineering, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 188, 189 (2009); see also Cripps, supra 
note 16, at 11 (noting that cloning was developed outside of the public consciousness before 
Dolly).  
 106. “The fertility industry . . . has developed largely outside federal funding or 
oversight.” Carbone, supra note 105, at 199. Because of religious opposition, there has been 
little or no federal funding for many fertility and reproductive technologies. Id. at 200. 
 107. See generally, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
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anticipation of possible manipulation of the system (a manipulation that arguably 
cuts against the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”108), it must be remembered that more than 200 years of discourse and 
case law have buttressed this system. Every change will affect the incentives the 
patent system provides. One such incentive is the incentive to invent, which 
requires the patent system to provide a broad scope of patent-eligible subject matter 
as an initial entryway towards patentability.109 If inventors have little hope that 
their new, useful, and nonobvious products will even be considered for 
patentability, then those inventors and their financial backers will have little 
motivation to invest time and money into the technology. Moreover, there should 
be incentives to invest in all technologies, as development in one arena often leads 
to unanticipated but important developments in tangential fields.110 
The U.S. patent system is a fundamental aspect of the successful U.S. economy, 
which has, over time, helped the United States remain a technological superpower. 
As our human existence becomes further “embedded”111 with technology, and as 
those technologies impact new and important individual liberties,112 it is important 
to realize that the incentives that the patent system provides are partially 
responsible for the realization of those liberties: new technologies encourage new 
fundamental expectations from society. 
In order to maintain the strength of the patent system and balance the need to 
guard reproductive choice, several courses of action can be considered. While all 
seem to have merit, upon deeper scrutiny many are unworkable or may create more 
problems than they resolve. The most promising of these courses of action may be 
the most unlikely: subjecting private patentees to the rigors of the Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Legislative Options 
1. Narrowing the Scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
In the most recent of the cases involving the patentability of human gene 
sequences, the district court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent 
                                                                                                                 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 109. The scope of patent-eligible subject matter is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
“According to the Supreme Court, patents serve three purposes: to promote invention, to 
encourage inventions, and to encourage inventors to disclose their inventions.” Saunders, 
supra note 23, at 426 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)). 
 110. In a simplistic example:  
Since the introduction of Post-it® Notes in 1980, the sticky yellow notes have 
become one of the best known of all 3M products. In a twist to the tradition of 
innovation, the product had its root as a solution looking for a problem. 3M 
research scientist, Dr. Spence Silver, first developed the technology in 1968 
while looking for ways to improve the acrylate adhesives that 3M uses in many 
of its tapes—but he found something remarkably different.  
Post-it® Notes . . . Little Sticky Notes that Revolutionized Messages, 3M CANADA, 
http://www.3m.com/cms/CA/en/1-30/rFzeEA/view.html.  
 111. See Thomas, supra note 9, at 610. 
 112. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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& Trademark Office (“Myriad”) held that patent claims to isolating and extracting 
gene sequences for the identification of breast cancer were invalid.113 Judge Sweet, 
in deciding the case in favor of the plaintiff, took a step toward narrowing the scope 
of patent-eligible material114—arguably, a step away from long-standing 
precedent.115 Myriad is illuminating with regard to managing the scope of 
technologies that are perceived to directly bear on the sanctity of the human 
body.116 On appeal from this decision, the appellants argued that 35 U.S.C. § 101 
should remain untouched and that there are other ways of limiting patent scope.117 
As the appellants argued, drawing from the history of patent eligibility may best 
demonstrate what the appellants perceive as a dramatic change by the lower court 
and may best support the broad language of the case law precedent.118 
The Patent Act of 1793 first introduced the idea of patent-eligible subject matter, 
stating that “any . . . art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter” was to be 
considered for letters patent.119 The early case law worked to narrow, but only 
slightly, the immense breadth of that original language. For example, after first 
allowing patents such as Louis Pasteur’s patent for an “[improvement in the 
manufacture of beer and yeast],” which contained claims to living organisms120 and 
would likely not be considered eligible today, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) began to announce some limitation on patentable 
subject matter starting with Ex Parte Latimer.121 In Latimer, the Commissioner of 
Patents ruled that a patent could not be obtained for a fiber identified in needles of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 
3211513 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
with regard to Myriad’s composition claims to isolated DNA). Commentators have strongly 
suggested that the Supreme Court will hear the case on certiorari. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & 
Jason Rantanen, Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court Myriad Preview, 
PATENTLYO L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2011/08/patentable-subject-matter.html.  
 114. Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 235–37 (holding several of Myriad’s patent claims 
invalid). 
 115. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 116. Myriad involved arguments regarding implications for “women facing the threat of 
breast cancer or who are in the midst of their struggle with the illness.” Myriad, 669 F. Supp. 
2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The case involved patent claims for gene sequences and mutations 
that “impact the body’s ability to create proteins necessary for sound health.” Id. at 377. 
When ruling on summary judgment the court stated that “[t]he resolution of the issues 
presented to this Court deeply concerns breast cancer patients, medical professionals, 
researchers, caregivers, advocacy groups, existing gene patent holders and their investors, 
and those seeking to advance public health.” Myriad, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185. 
 117. See generally Brief for the Appellants, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office, No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 3211513 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011). 
 118. Id. at 30–34. 
 119. Ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). Not until the 
recodification of the patent laws in 1952 was the term “art” replaced with the word 
“process.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 120. Manufacture of Beer and Yeast, U.S. Patent No. 141,072, at 1 (filed May 9, 1873). 
 121. 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123. 
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pine trees,122 and in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court further 
narrowed that decision by stating that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature.”123 However, since Funk Bros., only in the landmark case of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty124 has the Supreme Court enunciated an overriding test 
for patentability, stating: “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include 
anything under the sun that is made by man’” and that only “[t]he laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”125 The 
broad threshold for patent eligibility is to “ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a 
liberal encouragement.’”126 These decisions fundamentally stand for the 
proposition that inventive, novel, and useful technologies, in whatever form, should 
be ripe for at least patent consideration.  
From a historical perspective, in order to achieve a society that “encourage[d] 
the sharing, the creation, and the dissemination of ideas . . . the proper . . . system 
had to be implemented.”127 Significantly, “nowhere within this implementation was 
there a provision taking into account the ethical or moral repercussions of the ideas 
seeking protection.”128 After several attempts to introduce morality, ethics, and 
consumer protection into the patent examination procedure, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. effectively ended 
any such inquiry.129 The Federal Circuit pronounced that “[o]ther agencies, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, are assigned 
the task of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food 
products.”130 Put differently, the patent system was created to operate as an 
objective system designed to analyze inventiveness—not to analyze moral, ethical, 
societal, or constitutional implications of the subject matter sought to be 
patented.131  
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Id. at 123. 
 123. 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding that the properties of inhibition or of non-
inhibition in bacteria were “the work of nature” and therefore not patent eligible). 
 124. 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding the first genetically engineered single-cell organism to 
be patent eligible). “In choosing such expansive terms . . . modified by the comprehensive 
‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws should be given wide scope.” Id. at 
308.  
 125. Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 126. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (ruling on the patent eligibility of 
business method patents). “The Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 
101’s broad patent-eligibility principals: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.’” Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
 127. Richard Guerra, Comment, Therapeutic Cloning as Proper Subject Matter for 
Patent Eligibility, 43 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 695, 710 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The fact that customers may believe they are 
receiving fluid directly from the display tank does not deprive the invention of utility.”). 
 130. Id. at 1368. 
 131. Congress never granted the USPTO rulemaking authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). 
See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). And, as 
discussed, in Juicy Whip the Federal Circuit removed moral inquiry from the scope of the 
USPTO’s review.  
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In light of a large body of history and case precedent, legislative changes to the 
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to preemptively institute a system that could avoid issues 
of reproductive rights colliding with the property rights of patents may be a rash 
measure. By selectively excising technologies from patent consideration, Congress 
would be ignoring precedent that has matured over time and has been infused with 
decades of thought, insight, and deliberation.132 Congress would flirt with a 
slippery slope. Perhaps wisely, each time Congress has had opportunities to 
redefine the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101, it has declined.133 Presumably Congress does 
not want to uproot a patent system that has been a fundamental incentive for 
technological development in America’s capitalistic society. Since no one can 
predict all of the various paths that technology will take, Congress is well advised 
not to attempt to enumerate or carve out all exceptions. The current quasi-exception 
that limits patent infringement damages for certain medical activities134 should not 
be followed as common practice; Congress cannot legislate at the pace that 
technology will be introduced. Congress must create an anticipatory escape hatch 
instead of reactively introducing legislation. 
2. Statutory Patent Misuse 
One approach to ensuring that reproductive technologies that may bear on 
constitutional rights are not withheld by private actors is to leave the scope of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 untouched and fashion a statute similar to a patent misuse doctrine 
used in other countries.135 A common law patent misuse doctrine was once a part of 
the U.S. patent system but has since been effectively abandoned with the 
implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d).136 The patent misuse doctrine was an 
equitable defense that permitted “defendants in an infringement . . . action . . . [to] 
claim that the patentee plaintiff has ‘misused’ its patent grant.”137 The patent 
misuse doctrine was typically invoked in response to a patentee trying to extend or 
assert his or her patent rights beyond the scope of the exclusionary rights in his or 
her particular invention (e.g., patent-tying arrangements, antitrust violations, price 
fixing, and illegal use)—not when a patent was withheld from use. In fact, when 
codifying the patent misuse doctrine, Congress clearly refused accused infringers 
relief from infringement liability when a patentee “refused to license or use any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. See generally Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing 
Visions of Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2008) (presenting 
an excellent historical overview of the patent eligibility inquiry). 
 133. Congress has not altered 35 U.S.C. § 101 but rather has carved out exceptions from 
the statute’s scope. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000) (addressing areas on nonpatentable 
subject matter for reasons such as national security). 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006) (exempting certain medical activities that do not require a 
patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter). 
 135. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 16208; SHŌHŌ (COMM. C.) 2006, Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 32 (Japan). 
 136. The U.S. patent misuse doctrine was abandoned in lieu of 35 U.S.C. § 271 after the 
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-703, tit. II, 102 Stat. 4674. 
 137. Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 
CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1609 (1990). 
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rights to the patent.”138 Refusing to provide accused infringers with relief from 
liability in such circumstances was said to be codifying the existing common 
law.139 
As such, while the patent misuse concept has had some success in its various 
forms in foreign jurisdictions, it will not likely be revived in this country. First, 
legislatively creating a new statute to implement this doctrine would likely lead to 
increased litigation in an area of law that is already among the most expensive and 
time consuming.140 The difficulties in trying to limit its use as a defense and define 
what constitutes misuse would likely restrict the practical application of the 
doctrine. More importantly, it would appear that the version of patent misuse 
doctrine necessary here would be a reactionary remedy that would only enable 
application of the defense after a pattern of misuse had been established. This 
reactionary remedy is not the type of escape hatch necessary for thoughtful 
constraints on the “dizzying ambitions of the contemporary intellectual property 
community.”141 Furthermore, technologies particularly prone to misuse in the realm 
of reproductive rights might be those that are time sensitive. As such, the remedy 
might fail in that access to technologies would be delayed while a potential 
defendant (infringer) collected evidence to substantiate a defense for the 
infringement. 
3. USPTO Authority 
Alternatively, Congress could bestow authority on the USPTO to evaluate 
patents based on moral, ethical, or constitutional considerations. The USPTO does 
not have its own substantial rule-making power, and all of its promulgations are 
essentially nonbinding.142 However, with congressional delegation of authority, the 
USPTO could be used to screen technologies that have the potential to restrict 
reproductive rights. Aside from the fact that authorizing the USPTO to use 
subjective authority would be effectively rewriting 35 U.S.C. § 101 to add an 
explicit morality-type requirement, the USPTO and its examiners lack the 
competence and experience to act as a moral or constitutional authority for 
America. Given that the USPTO currently has a conservatively estimated eighteen-
month backlog of patents to examine and is already overburdened in its role as a 
technical assessor of invention,143 this is an impractical solution. Also, as noted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006). 
 139. 134 CONG. REC. 32295 (1988) (statements of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier). 
 140. See Patent Litigation: Is it Worth the Expense?, 26 GENETIC ENGINEERING & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/patent-
litigation-is-it-worth-the-expense/1454/. 
 141. Thomas, supra note 9, at 619. 
 142. The USPTO has no rule-making authority under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). See, e.g., 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 143. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Unreasonable Patent Applicant Delay and the 
USPTO Backlog, PATENTLYO L. BLOG (July 9, 2010, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/unreasonable-patent-applicant-delay-and-the-
uspto-backlog.html (“Over 1.2 million non-provisional patent applications are pending 
examination at the USPTO. Of those, more than 700,000 have not received even a 
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above, the courts have already addressed the use of moral considerations and 
consumer protection in granting patents, holding there is no proper place for that 
analysis within the USPTO.144 Finally, and more practically, there would be no way 
for the USPTO to know what type of inventions would impinge upon reproductive 
rights as of the time of filing—the Patent Office would need a crystal ball to 
evaluate patent applications under such criteria.145 
B. Judicial Options 
The solution to this institutional-level reform, therefore, does not seem to be 
best put in the hands of Congress alone. In addition to problems outlined above, the 
difficulties in implementing legislation and the extremely bipartisan, politically 
polarized environment in which the elected officials of Congress currently operate 
do not furnish fertile grounds for change. The judiciary remains a key regulating 
body in handling any effective, practical institutional-level change, as it has in 
many patent law issues over time. 
Three types of judicial changes could be implemented to create a feasible and 
robust system of regulating the withholding of patents that directly bear on the 
constitutional reproductive rights of citizens: (1) a compulsory licensing scheme 
similar to regulations under the Clean Air Act146 and Atomic Energy Act;147 (2) 
antitrust schemes; and (3) subjecting private patentees to the constitutional 
constraints of the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment by fashioning a logical 
way to connect private patentees to state action. 
1. Compulsory Licensing 
A compulsory licensing system could serve as a solution to reconciling the 
patent system with reproductive rights. For example, the language of Skinner, such 
as the right to “conceive and to raise one’s children,” a right “far more precious . . . 
than property rights,”148 could enable courts to justify a compulsory license. The 
courts could analogize to the Atomic Energy Act149 and the Clean Air Act,150 which 
                                                                                                                 
preliminary examination.”). 
 144. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
The government used to consider morality and consumer protection when reviewing 
technology for patentability (especially in the case of gambling), but that approach has since 
been deemed, in certain contexts, not to be in accord with the Patent Act of 1952. But see 
Holbrook, supra note 93, at 594 (“Currently, the patent system is viewed as morally 
agnostic, making no judgments about the value of individual patents. This perspective may 
need reconsideration in light of the biotechnology revolution.”). 
 145. It might be practical to give the USPTO authority to have applicants of inventions 
with reproductive implications sign a declaration at the time of filing stating that they will 
not withhold the technology, but this could also result in prohibitory pricing schemes. See 
infra Part III.C; see also Saunders, supra note 23, at 429–30.  
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006) (certain inventions to control air pollution are subject to 
compulsory licenses).  
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g) (2006). 
 148. Lesko & Buckley, supra note 37, at 29 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972)). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g). 
468 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:445 
 
 
provide clauses with semblance to compulsory licensing,151 and reasonably 
conclude that Congress desired that technologies which constitute public goods 
should not be susceptible to private decisions to withhold them from use. In one 
outlier case, the Ninth Circuit, in Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation,152 may have been attempting to do exactly that. In dicta, the 
court noted that the suppressive licensing practices of the plaintiff were against the 
“public interest” and constituted a “public offense,” which likely contributed to the 
ultimate decision to invalidate the patent-in-suit.153 
Compulsory licensing seems attractive in that it does not totally destroy the 
property rights of the patent holder and could be narrowed, relatively speaking, to 
the cases of patent suppression by a private patentee. Compulsory licensing in the 
United States could be tailored parallel to other countries’ patent regimes that entail 
a responsibility to work the patent rather than let it stagnate.154 This measure, 
however, would constitute a significant departure from the expectation of robust 
property rights traditional of the United States—thus, it may be difficult to enact. 
The analogy between policies that favor all citizens nationwide (e.g., provide 
cheap, clean energy to citizens) and a policy that favors only those who do not 
oppose the idea of reproductive choice is tenuous. Also, the Supreme Court has 
already deferred to Congress in this regard. For example, in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, the Court, dealing with the patentability of a modified living 
organism, stated that “[t]he choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy 
for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, 
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide.”155  
Moreover, this would require reversing Supreme Court precedent. In the specific 
context of companies refusing to license technology, the Supreme Court in 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.156 “rejected the argument that 
a patent should be unenforceable because the patentee was not using the patented 
[technology] and was continuing to exclude competitors from using the 
[technology].”157 The Court held that “such exclusion may be said to have been of 
                                                                                                                 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 7608. 
 151. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (“[A] district court of the United States . . . may issue an 
order requiring the person who owns such a patent to license it on such reasonable terms and 
conditions as the court, after hearing, may determine.”). 
 152. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945). 
 153. Id. at 945–46. 
 154. For example, China’s patent laws include such a regime. See Xiaohai Liu, A Study 
on Patent Compulsory License System in China – with Particular Reference to the Drafted 
3rd Amendment to the Patent Law of the P.R. of China, in 6 PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 115, 115–19 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et 
al. eds., 2009). Various international agreements have provided templates for such doctrines. 
Id.; see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), 
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), art. 31(a), reprinted in 47 Patent, Copyright & Trademark Rep. 
(BNA) 230 (Jan. 13, 1994).  
 155. 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (“Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on 
us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the 
Executive, and not to the courts.” (emphasis added)). 
 156. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
 157. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
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the very essence of the right conferred by the patent” and that “it is the privilege of 
any owner of property to use or not to use it, without question of motive.”158 Even 
in the face of various dissenting opinions criticizing the rule in Continental Paper 
Bag Co.,159 Congress eventually codified the case holding by enacting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d)(4), protecting a patentee who refuses to license his or her patented 
works.160  
Thus, while at first blush this option may seem feasible and would be similar to 
having a patent applicant sign a declaration requiring him or her to market the 
invention, it would constitute a major deviation from both legislative and judicial 
authority. Moreover, it would amount to a major derogation of expected property 
rights. Likely, a compulsory licensing scheme would lead back to the pitfalls of 
Congress having to implement a slow, reactionary, technology-by-technology 
approach toward a solution while facing evidence of clearly contradictory 
legislative history in analogous areas of law.161  
2. Antitrust 
In the context of RU-486, it has been postulated that “[a]lthough there are no 
reported cases that required a pharmaceutical company to market a drug, there are 
analogous cases in other areas [of law] which support the constitutionality of such 
an action.”162 In that regard, one commentator noted that “significantly, in antitrust 
cases, courts can order parties to take affirmative actions.”163 There are several 
examples of courts ordering companies to sell their products on the open market 
and ordering companies to permit competitors to use patents, trademarks, and trade 
secrets.164  
It is not within the scope of this Note to outline the vast contours of antitrust 
law, but, as with compulsory licensing, finding a solution with an antitrust scheme 
                                                                                                                 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1354–55 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing Continental Paper Bag Co., 210 
U.S. 405).  
 158. Continental Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 429. 
 159. E.g., Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 380–83 (1945) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).  
 160. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 161. While likely not a completely satisfactory solution, some saving grace is found in 
the Supreme Court’s recent pullback from the general rule that courts would issue permanent 
injunctions absent exceptional circumstances. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the 
Court suggested that it would be willing to grant permanent injunctions only where “the 
public interest would not be disserved.” 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Operating under this 
premise, a group willing to pay the damages resulting from an infringement suit brought by a 
patentee withholding reproductive technology would quite possibly not be enjoined from 
continuing the infringing activity going forward. This result would be a less satisfactory, 
back-door way to compulsory licensing, but certainly a type of forced “licensing” 
nonetheless. 
 162. Lees, supra note 49, at 1146. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire 
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 417 (1945); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 
835, 844–45 (D.N.J. 1953)); see also 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 327, at 133 (1978). 
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only at first appears to be workable. The act of withholding a patent on the type of 
technology at issue in this discussion, which would necessarily be technology that 
could not be designed around or easily disregarded in turn for other solutions, is 
analogous to an antitrust situation—it conjures images of true monopolies, which 
this country’s founders opposed.165 During the drafting of the first Patent Act, the 
founders debated whether patents were too much like anti-competitive 
monopolies.166 However, aside from the fact that patents by their very nature afford 
their owners a quasi-monopoly, a major problem is that there is no competition or 
market share domination to speak of: if a private patentee never markets the 
invention and gains no economic value, many of the basic elements of antitrust law 
are never violated.167  
Specifically, the historical foundation of antitrust litigation is in the realm of 
competition law under the Sherman Antitrust Act.168 Antitrust law was developed 
for the purpose of exposing concealed business negotiations that allowed price 
fixing and market domination,169 which would not be present when a product was 
never used to establish a market in the first place. Because of this fact, the case law 
surrounding patents in antitrust lawsuits would be largely unhelpful as precedent. 
In fact, the Federal Circuit has expressly held that patentees refusing to deal or 
market patent technology are free from antitrust liability regardless of their 
subjective intent, such as an anti-abortion agenda: 
We see no more reason to inquire into the subjective motivation of 
[patent holders] in refusing to sell or license [their] patented works than 
we found in evaluating the subjective motivation of a patentee in 
bringing suit to enforce that same right. In the absence of any indication 
of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham 
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from 
liability under the antitrust laws.170 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See generally EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL 
ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836 (1998). 
 166. Id. 
 167. “Standing alone, a refusal to use or license a patent is neither misuse nor an antitrust 
violation.” Saunders, supra note 23, at 431. Rather, only where other economic factors are 
implicated do antitrust considerations come into play. Id. (“The possibility for resort to 
antitrust law may arise . . . when there is horizontal collusion involving patents or when the 
patentee holds monopoly power in the relevant market . . . .”). 
 168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 169. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 54–
56 (The Free Press 1993) (1978); 3 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW: THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 4–9 (1983); see also 4 JULIAN O. VON 
KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN & MAUREEN MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION, at IX (2d ed. 2004). 
 170. CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. (In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 203 F.3d 
1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“We answer the threshold question of whether Xerox's 
refusal to sell its patented parts exceeds the scope of the patent grant in the negative. 
Therefore, our inquiry is at an end. Xerox was under no obligation to sell or license its 
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Antitrust solutions in this manner violate the quid pro quo that the patent system 
purports to establish171 and fly in the face of the enormously strong exclusionary 
property rights that a U.S. patent affords. 
3. Subjecting Private Patentees to the Rigors of the Bill of Rights 
Commentators have opined that with the “application of the state action doctrine 
and Intellectual Property Clause” being uncertain, a solution other than arguing for 
allowing constitutional defenses in cases of reproductive technology infringement 
should be advocated.172 As a leading authority on the topic, Professor Thomas 
explains that while typically “[c]onstitutional defenses apply only against 
government entities,” private patentees could fall under the state action doctrine, in 
which constitutional defenses can be applied against these nominally private parties 
because they enjoy sufficient governmental connections.173 Evaluating the state 
action doctrine within the sphere of patent law, Professor Thomas concludes that 
“patent law seems most unlikely to serve as the rudder for lending order to a state 
action doctrine that has so far avoided a coherent explanation”174 and that 
“constitutional protections such as substantive due process, equal protection, and 
freedom of speech are unlikely to be of direct application.”175 
However, more recent scholarship and litigation strategies demonstrate that the 
nexus between the applicability of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to private patentees may be less “unclear”176 than once imagined. 
Professor Holbrook has recently argued that the government conferring a patent on 
technologies could be seen as approving that technology: “Unlike other forms of 
property, therefore, the signal from a patent is necessarily intermingled with 
expressions of the government’s approval.”177 In discussing technology that bears 
on morality and potentially future constitutional rights,178 such as the “gay gene” 
and behavioral sciences, Holbrook notes that “[m]any of these discoveries are 
patentable, and the government grant of a patent on these technologies could signal 
approbation of such technologies.”179 Thus, “[t]he patent system is . . . directly 
                                                                                                                 
patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so.” (citation omitted)); 
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implicated in these technologies and is fostering an incentive to create eugenic 
technologies that will be in the hands of private parties.”180  
Holbrook’s reasoning presents a new concept of the patent system that lends 
support for Thomas’s initial proposition “that patentees [should] accept 
constitutional responsibility for an elevation in status.”181 Under this reasoning, the 
protection that a private patentee receives from the government could be justifiably 
withdrawn where rights are violated. As Professor Holbrook points out, “[t]he 
courts have found laws unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause even 
absent any actual, non-psychic harm: the expression of these views alone is 
sufficient.”182 This lends credibility to the argument that the issuance of a patent 
alone might be enough to show government interference. Harkening to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Palmore v. Sidoti, while “[p]rivate biases may be outside 
the reach of the law . . . the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”183 
Some momentum has built behind the insinuations that the U. S. government can 
no longer let patent rights, which can be “conceived as a sort of private 
legislation,”184 exist in a world separate from constitutional protections. New 
constitutional challenges using the Intellectual Property Clause and First 
Amendment arguments have already been percolating and gathering strength under 
these theories. 
For example, this reasoning has gained some support in that new litigation 
strategies have started to include constitutional arguments that assert what used to 
be irrelevant considerations. The complaint filed by the ACLU in the Myriad case 
contains a series of such arguments along with several amicus briefs that present 
these “novel” positions.185 The plaintiffs asserted that Myriad’s patent hindered the 
“promotion of the useful arts” under Article I of the U.S. Constitution and inhibited 
scientific research in the area of breast cancer diagnosis.186 
New theories that frame the scope of patent protection as not singularly private 
action could reinvigorate and buttress Justice Douglas’s several dissents in 
response to the holding in Continental Paper Bag Co. Douglas’s remarks in 1945 
that patent suppression “preclude[s] experimentation which might result in further 
invention by competitors,” which is “a clog to our economic machine and a barrier 
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to an economy of abundance,” ring even more true today.187 New views of the 
patent system, such as Holbrook’s, add fresh persuasive force to Douglas’s half-
century-old conclusion that “[i]t is difficult to see how that [suppression] of patents 
can be reconciled with the purpose of the Constitution ‘to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts.’”188  
While Holbrook’s “expressive impact of patents” theory and other lines of 
argument, such as those found, tangentially, in Professor Burk’s recent scholarship 
in Do Patents Have Gender?,189 may provide new ways to connect private 
patentees directly with the Constitution in a way that could allow parties to traverse 
the state action doctrine, there still may be some pitfalls to such a solution. Namely, 
in a case where an individual needs access to a reproductive technology in a way 
that affects her Fourteenth Amendment rights, should such an important technology 
be invented, the appeal could take years. As explored above, individuals 
demanding access to reproductive technologies may be in time-sensitive plights 
(especially in the case of abortion) and cannot be slowly dragged through the 
appeal process, or maybe not even the initial litigation process.190  
Finally, issues of standing may arise as well as issues of whether such a decision 
would violate the rule against advisory opinions if a party were to seek a 
declaratory judgment. For example, in the Myriad case, amicus briefs have 
correctly pointed out that Judge Sweet’s opinion, in essence, was the equivalent to 
a prohibited advisory opinion: 
In its attempt to be sensitive to the social implications of this case, the 
District Court impermissibly expanded its declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction to cover an “advisory opinion” for anyone merely 
expressing the desire to purchase a patented product or utilize a patent 
method, including non-existent products and services. However, this 
decision, if affirmed, presents a very real concern for other federal 
courts and patent holders. The dramatic expansion of federal 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to those without a real and immediate 
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interest in the litigation will open all patents to challenge by anyone 
asserting a “public” interest.191 
This is exactly the same scenario that would be present if plaintiffs seeking 
declaratory judgment were to assert constitutional violations in the context of 
reproductive rights. 
C. A Hybrid Alternative 
Even with a more substantial nexus between private patentees, state action, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as can be inferred from recent scholarship and trends 
mentioned in Part III.B.3 above,192 the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment 
likely remains too muddled and unpredictable to be immediately useful. None of 
the traditional remedies enumerated above, used by themselves, provides an 
efficiently administrable remedy—each having its own significant pitfalls.  
One remedy that may be all-at-once easy to administer, cost effective, and 
anticipatory of exploitation of the patent system is to legislatively require an 
additional “statement of intended use” declaration by the named patent inventors.193 
Such a declaration or oath would be akin to the “oath or declaration” already 
prescribed by the USPTO.194 The current MPEP § 1.63 oath requires the declarant 
to certify the “named . . . inventors to be the original and first . . . inventors of the 
subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought,” among other 
things.195 While the MPEP § 1.63 oath is submitted along with an original patent 
filing, the proposed additional oath or declaration would be required after a filed 
patent received its “official filing receipt” and “preliminary classification.”196 Only 
if the preliminary classification placed the patent in a classification field 
corresponding with reproductive technologies would the declarant be required to 
file the additional oath or declaration. The oath would then attach to the patent and 
be carried along with it through any subsequent licenses or assignments if the 
patent were to issue. 
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The proposed additional oath would be configured to require the declarant to 
further certify that the technology at issue would not be withheld from 
commercialization in bad faith. In the vast majority of cases the inventor seeking to 
patent a reproductive technology will not be doing so with the intention to withhold 
but rather to commercialize the invention. With only the very minimal expense of 
exchanging of documentations between the USPTO and the inventors, reproductive 
technologies with the potential to be used in a manner that would violate existing or 
future reproductive rights197 will have a prenegotiated disposition towards 
commercialization. This would all be done with minimal cost or intrusion to the 
prosecution process of the typical patentee. 
This additional oath would create a disfavored subsection of technology similar 
to the disfavored medical procedure class of inventions.198 However, instead of 
having a slow-moving Congress not in touch with the state-of-the-art, attempt to 
statutorily predetermine what technologies would be disfavored, that determination 
would be left to the technologically savvy USPTO. In this way the additional oath 
would be a hybrid preventive measure that would call on (1) Congress to enable the 
USPTO to issue the additional oath; (2) the USPTO to determine if the technology 
at issue in a patent application has inventive aspects which tread on human 
reproduction and thus require the additional oath from the patent filer; and (3) the 
courts, only in the rare instance of bad faith, “private legislation”-type199 uses of a 
patent, to interpret the oath and any evidence of violation thereof to determine 
whether the quid pro quo200 of the patent exchange was violated. 
The oath would only affect a very limited class of inventors and inventions and 
would preemptively mitigate attempts at using the patent system as a means of 
“private legislation.” But it would nevertheless be seen as a derogation of the 
robust patent rights promulgated by our founders. Likely, it would be seen by some 
as an extreme derogation in light of the traditional interface of antitrust laws and 
compulsory licensing schemes with withheld patents.201 While many issues would 
need to be resolved and harmonized if an additional “statement of intended use” 
oath were to be implemented, some of those issues may be more easily traversed by 
the fact that the oath would be administered before the patent issued.202 In other 
words, since the oath would come before issuance, the granted patent would never 
carry with it the right to withhold the technology in bad faith. In other words, there 
would be no right to eviscerate because it was never created.  
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While the addition of a “statement of intended use” declaration for reproductive 
technologies appears to be a viable option to mitigate the risk of having 
reproductive technologies with potential constitutional implication withheld from 
use, there are of course always alternatives. In fact, there are likely alternatives or 
modifications that may more easily mesh with the historical precedent of patent 
withholding. As such, this Note should not be viewed as trying to prescribe one 
particular remedy. Rather, it is a call to action and a compilation of possible ways 
to think about solutions that recognizes that “[d]iscussing and crafting the patent 
system’s vision of technology within the public sphere will raise awareness among 
legislators, judges, scholars, and the public of [this] inquiry’s critical role within the 
patent system, and its critical impact on society.”203 By narrowly focusing on the 
reproductive set of fundamental rights, more can be gained about finding solutions 
to technologies that directly bear on other fundamental rights. For example, if the 
state action doctrine could be traversed in the courts, Congress could also enact 
statutes under the Commerce Clause which would prohibit further private 
expression of private biases via the patent system.  
Moreover, it is hoped that the message is clear: without addressing this issue in a 
timely fashion and finding a workable solution, undesirable solutions or 
consequences may result. If there is not a solution to the “pervasive creep of 
technology into formerly sacrosanct areas of life”204 that provides for people’s 
perceived reproductive rights, they will find reproductive choice elsewhere. The 
phenomenon of “reproductive tourism”205 will continue to grow. As was true with 
RU-486, “if the [technology] is obtained through the black market rather than 
through normal means, it will lose some of its safety value.”206 For example, like 
the Italian ban on IVF, a patentee withholding a technology related to reproduction 
would spur fertility tourism.207 And, just like the result from the Italian legislation, 
the procedures would become more expensive and less effective.208 Patents that 
take the shape of private legislation make the United States an unwelcoming 
jurisdiction for those who need the reproductive options the most: “When a 
jurisdictions [sic] limits treatment to married couples, gays and lesbians—who may 
already feel excluded from parts of mainstream society . . . [they] may be among 
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the first groups to seek alternative treatments abroad.”209 In other words, groups of 
people who are in already burdened classes of society would be affected the 
greatest. By allowing private patentees to “block development of new technology,” 
a jurisdiction would “simply lose any ability to contribute to the terms on which 
[that technology] develops.”210  
For example, “to the extent that reproductive tourism relies on the use of others’ 
bodies, it relies primarily on women’s bodies.”211 Even in the case of male 
infertility, most of the treatments for infertility are administered to women.212 In 
that sense, “ART is a gendered technology”: it is women who bear most of the 
health risk, as well as the social stigmas, while men, at most, bear the financial 
burden.213 Thus, encouraging “reproductive tourism” is encouraging the unequal 
protection of women.214 
 If a technology that is capable of truly revolutionizing reproductive choice is 
withheld, the fact will be as such: “It’s coming. The question is whether it will 
come unsupervised and unsafe or supervised and safe.”215 Where constitutional 
values are at stake, a solution must be found. 
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